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The Strange Career of the Transnational 
Legal Order of Cannabis Prohibition 
By Ely Aaronson* 
There is a crack in everything — that’s how the light gets in
  Leonard Cohen, Anthem
In an era often characterized as one of growing convergence of the laws 
governing criminal activities in different countries, the issue-area of cannabis 
policy undergoes processes of fragmentation and polarization. Some countries 
continue to criminalize all forms of medical and recreational uses of 
cannabis. Others have sought to “separate the market” for cannabis from 
that of other drugs by decriminalizing the possession of small amounts of 
marijuana, authorizing its use for medical purposes, and establishing 
administrative measures for taxing and regulating the commercial sale of the 
drug. This Article explores the causes and consequences of the decline of the 
transnational legal order of cannabis prohibition. It shows how the erosion 
of the regulatory capacities of this transnational legal order reflects deep-
seated political conflicts over the legitimacy of prohibition norms in this field. 
It analyzes the ways in which conflicting regulatory approaches become 
institutionalized as a consequence of the structural mismatch between the 
actors framing the meaning of cannabis prohibition norms at the 
international level and the actors implementing these norms in national and 
local contexts. Finally, the Article shows how this transnational legal order 
has created path-dependent trajectories of legal change that continue to shape 
domestic drug policies.
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INTRODUCTION
With its roots in international treaties signed during the League of Nations 
Era, the transnational legal order (TLO) of cannabis prohibition represents one of 
the most sustained efforts to develop internationally applicable standards for 
governing illicit markets.1 The vast majority of United Nations (UN) member states 
are now parties to the three major international drug conventions, which require 
criminalizing the production, distribution, and use of cannabis. Over the past 
decades, the cannabis prohibition TLO has come to encompass an extensive array 
of legal instruments for monitoring implementation efforts,2 disseminating 
information on the activities of drug trafficking networks,3 and facilitating 
cooperation among national police forces.4 However, despite the extensive 
institutionalization of this TLO, cannabis remains the most widely used illegal drug 
in the world. The 2018 World Drug Report estimates that at least 192 million people 
aged 15–64 had used cannabis in the preceding year.5 With the percentage of adults 
reporting cannabis use in North American and European countries far exceeding 
the international average, cannabis use has become integrated into mainstream 
culture in a large number of countries.6
In an era that is often characterized as one of a growing isomorphism of the 
laws and procedures governing criminal activities in different countries,7 the issue-
area of cannabis policy undergoes processes of fragmentation and polarization.8
Some countries continue to criminalize all forms of medical and recreational uses 
of cannabis. Others have sought to “separate the market” for cannabis from that of 
other drugs by decriminalizing the possession of small amounts of marijuana, 
1. PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION
AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATION 3 (2006).
2.  RICHARD H. FRIMAN, Behind the Curtain: Naming and Shaming in International Drug Control, in
THE POLITICS OF LEVERAGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: NAME, SHAME, AND SANCTION 143 
(Richard H. Friman ed., 2015). 
3.  BEN BOWLING, POLICING THE CARIBBEAN: TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
IN PRACTICE 118–20 (2010).
4.  JORG FRIEDRICHS, FIGHTING TERRORISM AND DRUGS: EUROPE AND INTERNATIONAL
POLICE COOPERATION (2008). 
5.  U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2018: Analysis of Drug Markets 43, 
U.N. Sales No. E.18.XI.9 (2018), https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/WDR18_Booklet_ 
3_DRUG_ MARKETS.pdf.
6.  HOWARD PARKER ET AL., ILLEGAL LEISURE: THE NORMALIZATION OF ADOLESCENT
RECREATIONAL DRUG USE (1998).
7.  ANJA JAKOBI, COMMON GOODS AND EVILS? THE FORMATION OF GLOBAL CRIME
GOVERNANCE (2013). 
8.  DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL: CONSENSUS FRACTURED
(2012); Caroline Chatwin, UNGASS 2016: Insights from Europe on the Development of Global Cannabis Policy 
and the Need for Reform of the Global Drug Policy Regime, 49 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 80 (2017).
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authorizing its use for medical purposes, and establishing administrative measures 
for taxing and regulating the commercial sale of the drug.9 These reforms have 
gained international momentum despite resistance from key actors in the 
international drug control system, including the International Narcotic Control 
Board (INCB) and the US federal government.10 The proliferation of cannabis-
liberalization reform is frequently depicted as a historical step toward the collapse 
not only of this TLO but of the entire edifice of the international narcotic control 
system of which it forms a part.11
How deep is the current crisis of the cannabis prohibition TLO? What are its 
causes and consequences? What does this case study reveal about the conditions 
under which criminal justice TLOs rise and fall? In this Article, I explore these 
questions to demonstrate the complex ways in which the cannabis prohibition TLO 
has served as a battleground between competing conceptions of the role of criminal 
law in addressing social and medical harms. Drawing on TLO theory,12 the Article 
shows that the capacity of the cannabis prohibition TLO to regulate the practices 
of legal actors at the international, national, and local levels has been eroded as a 
result of effective contestations of the input and output legitimacy of its governance 
endeavors. The rapid and widespread diffusion of new models of decriminalization, 
depenalization, and legalization has relied on the operation of mechanisms of 
recursive transnational lawmaking. These mechanisms originate from the 
indeterminacy of drug prohibition norms, the ideological contradictions between 
competing interpretations of their meaning, the impact of diagnostic struggles over 
the social issues that the international drug control system should address, and the 
mismatch between the actors shaping formal prohibition norms at the international 
level and those implementing these norms in national and local contexts. However, 
our analysis also shows that the cannabis prohibition TLO creates path-dependent 
trajectories that constrain the development of non-punitive strategies for regulating 
cannabis markets. In this context, the Article explains why it is too early to sound 
the death knell for the prohibitionist agenda of cannabis control. The dense array 
of UN treaties, transnational and regional monitoring schemes, national laws, and 
local enforcement arrangements put in place throughout the institutionalization of 
the cannabis prohibition TLO impede efforts to initiate more progressive regulatory 
innovations in this field. 
The Article is organized as follows: Section I briefly introduces the historical 
formation of the international legal framework governing cannabis regulations. It 
9. For an assessment of different models of cannabis liberalization reform, see ROBIN ROOM
ET AL., CANNABIS POLICY: MOVING BEYOND STALEMATE (2010). 
10.  Bewley-Taylor, supra note 8, at 219–78. 
11.  ADAM BLACKWELL, IF THE WAR ON DRUGS IS OVER. . .NOW WHAT? (2015); Wayne 
Hall, The Future of the International Drug Control System and National Drug Prohibitions, 113 ADDICTION 1210 
(2018).
12.  GREGORY SHAFFER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (2013); 
TERENCE HALLIDAY & GREGORY SHAFFER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (2015); Gregory 
Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 12 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 231 (2016). 
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also identifies the inherent ambiguities giving rise to interpretive disagreements 
regarding the scope of application of cannabis prohibition norms. Section II 
examines the debates that evolved during the 1960s–70s regarding the 
criminological logic of drug prohibition policies and the cannabis liberalization 
reforms shaped by these debates. It then considers the processes leading to the 
reversal of these liberalizing trends and the extensive institutionalization of new 
measures reinforcing strict interpretations of the prohibition norms enshrined in 
the international treaties. Section III discusses the causes and consequences of the 
legitimation crisis that the cannabis prohibition TLO has experienced since the mid-
1990s as well as the global wave of depenalization, decriminalization, and 
legalization reforms precipitated by this crisis. Section IV considers the extent to 
which this wave of cannabis liberalization reform lessens the impact of the 
prohibitionist approach on the development of cannabis regulations at the 
international, national, and local levels. 
I. CANNABISPROHIBITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Cannabis prohibition laws were initially established in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries through disparate national drug control initiatives.13 Over 
the course of the nineteenth century, cannabis medical uses were regulated in a 
patchwork manner as part of wider legal frameworks governing the production and 
sale of pharmaceuticals. In the US, cannabis use began to be perceived as a social 
problem that should be a subject of criminal regulation during the Progressive Era.14
This criminalization campaign was inspired by the legislative inroads made by the 
temperance movement during that period and by awakening nativist sentiments 
toward incoming Mexican migrants, whose habits of marijuana smoking became 
major objects of media attention and public anxiety.15 In 1915, California 
introduced the nation’s first anti-marijuana criminal prohibition. Three decades 
later, such prohibitions appeared in the statute books of forty-six states and a series 
of marijuana-related federal offenses were included in the Marijuana Tax Act of 
1937.16
The transnational legal ordering of cannabis regulations originated during the 
League of Nations era.17 An earlier international drug convention, signed at The 
Hague in 1912, focused on regulating opium, morphine, and cocaine and did not 
include implementation mechanisms. Under the League’s auspices, new 
requirements concerning the regulation of medical and non-medical uses of 
cannabis were introduced at the 1925 International Opium Convention. However, 
13.  Toby Seddon, Inventing Drugs: A Genealogy of a Regulatory Concept, 43 J. L. & SOC’Y 393 (2016).
14.  PETER ANDREAS, SMUGGLER NATION: HOW ILLICIT TRADE MADE AMERICA 253–62
(2013); DAVID MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL (1973). 
15.  Steven Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689 (2016). 
16.  ANDREAS, supra note 14, at 268. 
17.  Paul Knepper, Dreams and Nightmares: Drug Trafficking and the History of International Crime, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 208 (2016). 
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the pre-UN frameworks of international drug control did not place emphasis on the 
use of punitive measures to regulate cannabis or other psychoactive substances. 
Although the US had strongly advocated the introduction of a strict prohibitionist 
approach, this position was met with resistance from European colonial powers that 
had significant financial interests in the production of opium and coca and the 
manufacturing of their derivatives.18 In the absence of an international consensus 
regarding the need to strengthen the criminal regulation of illicit drug use, the pre-
UN drug control framework focused on the development of administrative 
measures to govern cross-border commodity flows and to encourage a more 
effective domestic regulation of local drug markets.19
Following WWII, the growing capacity of the US to shape the rules and 
institutions of the international drug control system facilitated the move of the 
prohibitionist approach from the periphery to the center of the policy agenda.20 To 
a considerable extent, the institutionalization of the cannabis prohibition TLO 
provides a paradigmatic example of what has been usefully conceptualized as 
“globalized localism”21—a process by which policy models that originated in the 
distinctive cultural and institutional contexts of a powerful country come to be 
perceived as global standards due to their inclusion in treaties, diagnostic indicators, 
interpretive guidelines, and other instruments of transnational legal diffusion. The 
introduction of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961 served as an 
important milestone in this process.22 The Convention frames the issue of drug use 
as a moral problem, stating in its preamble that “addiction to narcotic drugs 
constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic 
danger to mankind.” In line with this moralizing framing, the Convention requires 
signatory countries to criminalize a wide range of drug-related activities. For 
example, Article 36 of the Single Conventions reads: 
Subject to its constitutional limitations, each party shall adopt such 
measures as will ensure that cultivation, production, manufacture, 
extraction, preparation, possession, offering for sale, distribution, 
purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, 
dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs 
contrary to the provisions of this Convention . . . shall be punishable 
offences when committed intentionally . . . . 
The two subsequent UN drug conventions adopted in 1971 and 1988 sought 
to extend the application of the prohibitionist approach to new contexts of drug 
18.  WILLIAM MCALLISTER, DRUG DIPLOMACY IN THE TWENTY CENTURY: AN
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY (2002). 
19.  Danilo Ballotta et al., Cannabis Control in Europe, in A CANNABIS READER: GLOBAL ISSUES
AND LOCAL EXPERIENCES 97 (Paul Griffiths ed., 2008). 
20.  DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR, THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
1909-1997, at 118–20 (2002). 
21.  BOAVENTURA DE SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND 
POLITICS IN PARADIGMATIC TRANSITIONS (1995). 
22.  NEIL BOISTER, PENAL ASPECTS OF THE UN DRUG CONVENTIONS 67 (2001). 
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regulation. Responding to the increasing production and use of synthetic drugs as 
part of the rise of the counter-cultural movements of the late 1960s, the 1971 
Psychotropic Drug Treaty applied these policy principles to synthetic psychoactive 
drugs, such as opioids and amphetamine-type stimulants. The 1988 Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna 
Convention) further expanded the array of criminal justice enforcement measures 
states are required to adopt. Importantly, however, the mandatory criminalization 
norms established by the UN drug conventions are defined in a manner that leaves 
two major sources of textual ambiguity regarding their scope of application. First, 
the conventions deliberately refrain from providing a definition of what constitutes 
medical and scientific uses of drugs. Second, they clarify that countries should 
implement the duty to criminalize drug-related activities in accordance with their 
domestic constitutional principles. As is often the case, these two provisions are 
products of efforts to paper over divergent policy preferences. During the 
negotiations of the Single Convention, several countries objected to banning certain 
drugs that have traditional and quasi-medical uses among indigenous populations. 
India, for example, expressed concerns regarding the implied need to criminalize 
traditional uses of bhang, which is made from cannabis leaves with a low 
Tetrahydrocannabinol (TOC) content.23 Other countries emphasized the need to 
retain interpretive flexibility in light of the possibility that future research would 
reveal new medical benefits. The resulting compromise encouraged countries that 
would not have otherwise supported the prohibitionist principles set by the treaties 
to come on board. However, this compromise also sowed the seeds of later 
controversies regarding the ways in which cannabis prohibition norms should be 
applied. As the following discussion shows, these controversies will set recursive 
processes of transnational legal change in motion, leading to the settling and 
unsettling of specific interpretations of the scope and meaning of these norms.24
II. INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: THE EARLY CRISIS OF THE 
CANNABIS PROHIBITION TLO
It is an irony of history that the first decade following the entry into force of 
the Single Convention experienced a marked increase in the prevalence of cannabis 
use in Western countries. When the Single Convention was signed in 1961, cannabis 
use was particularly prevalent in developing countries where the plant was 
traditionally cultivated, while it had little impact on mainstream culture in North 
America and Europe. By the end of the decade, the drug acquired unprecedented 
political salience not only in light of objective increases in the prevalence of its use 
but also due to its symbolic association with emerging countercultures and the 
perceived threat they putatively posed to public morality. These dramatic changes 
23.  BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 190. 
24.  See Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 12, at 37–42. 
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intensified the enforcement of cannabis offenses, but they also attracted heightened 
public attention to the negative consequences of such enforcement efforts.
In the late 1960s, there was an historical increase in the rates of arrests, 
prosecutions, and convictions of cannabis users in various Western countries. The 
magnitude of this change was most remarkable in the US. In California, for example, 
the number of people arrested for marijuana offenses increased from about 5,000 
in 1960 to 37,514 in 1967.25 Arrests for cannabis possession became increasingly 
common in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada as well.26 The 
civil rights implications of these increased levels of drug law enforcement generated 
vigorous public debate on the justifications of treating cannabis on par with other 
psychoactive substances that are widely perceived to be more dangerous and 
harmful.27 Disagreements regarding whether cannabis should be classified under the 
strictest schedules of the UN drug control treaties were already evident during the 
Plenipotentiary Conference, which drafted the Single Convention However, it was 
only as a result of the increased enforcement of cannabis prohibitions that such 
disagreements precipitated domestic forms of political and legal resistance. Due to 
increasing public criticism, national governments in several countries appointed 
public committees to consider the effectiveness of the existing laws. These 
committees directed strong criticism towards the criminological and medical 
underpinnings of the prohibitionist approach and sided with proponents of the 
decriminalization of mild forms of cannabis use. 
In Great Britain, the Advisory Committee on Drugs Dependence (Wootton 
Report), published in 1969, concluded: 
[The] long term consumption of cannabis in moderate doses has no harmful 
effects . . . There is no evidence that this activity is causing violent crime, 
or is producing in otherwise normal people conditions of dependence or 
psychosis requiring medical treatment . . . there are indications that 
(cannabis) may become a functional equivalent of alcohol . . . possession 
of a small amount of cannabis should not normally be regarded as a serious 
crime to be punished by imprisonment (Home Office 1968).28
Broadly similar conclusions were reached by other committees operating in 
the Netherlands (The Baan Commission, 1970 and Hulsman Commission, 1971), 
Canada (The Commission of Inquiry into the Nonmedical Use of Drugs, commonly 
referred to as the Le Dain Commission, 1973), and Australia (Senate Social 
Committee on Social Welfare, 1977).29 In the US, the public debate that followed 
25. EMILY DUFTON, GRASS ROOTS: THE RISE AND FALL AND RISE OF MARIJUANA IN 
AMERICA 7 (2017). 
26.  DANILO BALLOTTA ET AL., supra note 19, at 101; Tim Van Solinge, The Dutch Model of 
Cannabis Decriminalization and Tolerated Retail, in DUAL MARKETS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO 
REGULATION 145, 147 (Ernesto Savona et al. eds., 2017). 
27.  KATHLEEN FRYDL, THE DRUG WAR IN AMERICA, 1940–1973, at 350 (2013). 
28.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE, CANNABIS: REPORT BY THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE (1968). 
29.  DANILO BALLOTTA ET AL., supra note 19, at 112. 
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President Nixon’s famous identification of drug abuse as “America’s public enemy 
number one” led to the nomination of the National Commission on Marihuana and 
Drug Abuse (the Shafer Commission). To the surprise of many, the Commission’s 
1972 Report, entitled Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, concurred with the 
liberal approach endorsed by other national investigation committees. While the 
Commission emphasized that cannabis was not a harmless substance, it stressed 
that its dangers had often been overstated. It advocated repealing the criminal 
prohibitions on the possession of small amounts of marijuana and establishing 
alternative measures to address the public health concerns associated with cannabis 
use. Such reforms, the Commission stated, are needed to relieve “the law 
enforcement community of the responsibility for enforcing a law of questionable 
utility, and one which they cannot fully enforce.”30 These recommendations were 
repudiated by the Nixon administration, but they inspired grassroots activists to 
mobilize cannabis liberalization reforms at the state and local levels. In 1973, 
Oregon became the first state that decriminalized the possession of small amounts 
(28.35 grams) of marijuana. Eleven states followed suit during the next half of the 
decade.31
The failure of the US national administration to secure the compliance of state 
governments with the prohibitionist norms it sought to propagate internationally 
provided a clear indication of the decline of the cannabis prohibition TLO. 
However, rather than precipitating the global circulation of new models of 
cannabis-liberalization reform, this early crisis stimulated new cycles of recursive 
transnational lawmaking, leading to the entrenchment of the prohibitionist 
approach. In the US, calls to reintroduce tougher drug laws resonated with the wider 
conservative offensive against the putative “soft on crime” inclinations of liberal 
policymakers in the post-civil rights era.32 Opponents of legalization sought to 
challenge the public health frame that gained increasing influence in the wake of the 
Shafer Commission’s Report and to contextualize the issue of cannabis use as yet 
another symptom of a putative law and order crisis in American cities. The 
proliferation of grassroots parents’ movements lobbying for the stricter regulation 
of marijuana provided considerable political momentum for the introduction of 
tougher penalties for trafficking and possession offenses.33
The process by which cannabis prohibition norms again became settled at the 
national level in the US provided facilitative conditions for the increasing 
involvement of the federal government in exporting its drug policies to other 
countries. This effort became increasingly consequential in an historical moment in 
which the US came to perceive itself “not just as a powerful state operating in a 
30.  NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF 
MISUNDERSTANDING 150 (1972). 
31.  DUFTON, supra note 25, at 69–70. 
32. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A PUBLIC OF FEAR (2007).
33.  DUFTON, supra note 25, at ch. 8. 
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world of anarchy” but as “a producer of world order.”34 With the end of the Cold 
War, new discourses of “securitization” emerged as part of the search for a new way 
of grounding America’s internationalist engagement.35 Drug policy became 
increasingly aligned with national security issues pertaining to the activities of 
insurgent and terrorist groups in Latin American countries and to the risks posed 
by these groups to the democratic stability and peace in the region.36 This new frame 
of diagnosing the implications of the illegal drug trade led to the development of 
new modes of defining the goals of US counternarcotic policies as well as the 
strategies through which such goals should be pursued. These new strategies have 
sought to reduce drug production at the source, to combat drug trafficking en route
to US borders, to dismantle international illicit drug networks, to reduce drug 
demand at home and abroad, and to incentivize foreign governments to cooperate 
with US counternarcotic goals. The institutionalization of these strategies 
necessitated strengthening the capacity of the US government to influence the drug 
policies of other countries and to dominate the transnational agenda of cannabis 
control.
From the mid-1980s onwards, the US government institutionalized an array 
of multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral measures intended to coerce, induce, and 
socialize other countries to cooperate with its counternarcotic strategies.37 Its 
multilateral efforts have largely been based on the extensive funding and support of 
international and regional organizations that are committed to the prohibitionist 
approach. In this context, the US has consistently pushed for an expansion of the 
International Narcotic Control Board’s monitoring authority and has served as a 
staunchest defender of its prohibitionist policies.38 Building on and expanding the 
scope of the international obligations enshrined in the Vienna Convention and the 
INCB recommendations, the US has made extensive use of bilateral treaties to 
create an issue-linkage between states’ willingness to adopt zero-tolerance models 
of drug policy and their eligibility for foreign aid. Over the next decades, such 
bilateral agreements provided a basis for the operation of extensive cooperation and 
capacity-building projects in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Peru, Ghana, Thailand, and many others. 
Along with these multilateral and bilateral instruments used to influence the 
drug policies of other countries, the US government has had an extensive reliance 
on unilateral tools of imposing economic and reputational sanctions on 
noncompliant states. In 1986, Congress introduced the Omnibus Drug 
Enforcement, Education, and Control Act, which created a certification process for 
34.  G. John Ikenberry, Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World Order in Transition, 5 INT’L.
REL. ASIA-PACIFIC 133, 133 (2005). 
35.  Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 102–07 
(2010).
36.  DOUG STOKES, AMERICA’S OTHER WAR: TERRORIZING COLOMBIA (2005). 
37.  McLeod, supra note 35, at 108–31. 
38.  BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 272. 
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drug-producing and drug-transit countries.39 The certification process requires the 
president to withdraw financial assistance and support in multilateral lending 
institutions from countries that fail to comply with requisite benchmarks of anti-
drug policy. To enable congressional deliberations over such sanctions, the US 
Department of State submits an annual International Narcotic Control Strategy 
Report (INCSR) that identifies the major illicit drug-producing and drug-transit 
countries and evaluates the extent to which their domestic policies are in compliance 
with the US counternarcotic agenda. The INCSR narrative explores a wide range of 
countries (e.g., 70 countries in the 2018 report). The certification process is applied 
to countries included in what came to be known as the Majors List (which included 
22 countries in 2018).40
The success of the US to coerce and to induce dozens of countries to adopt 
its preferred models of implementing cannabis prohibitions promoted convergence 
of drug laws across jurisdictions and thus increased the degree of concordance 
between the transnational and the national levels of this TLO. However, the global 
diffusion of tougher cannabis laws cannot be sufficiently explained by focusing on 
the coercive mechanisms employed by the US alone. This diffusion was also a 
product of broader social transformations stimulating increasing political 
mobilization around law and order issues during the final decades of the twentieth 
century.41 Illustrating Durkheim’s observation that societies have a functional need 
to construct categories of deviance,42 the instigation of moral panics concerning 
drug abuse epidemics provide a useful tool of identifying “suitable enemies” and 
scoring political points.43 In an era during which a broader shift from welfare-
oriented to punitive-focused approaches to governing social marginality took 
place,44 strengthening state capacities to condemn and to penalize drug dealers and 
users proved to be a far more attractive project for politicians than undertaking to 
address the public health implications of drug use. 
As the primary international organization responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the UN drug conventions, the INCB played an important role 
in facilitating the concordance between the transnational and national levels of the 
cannabis prohibition TLO. In its annual reports, the INCB has repeatedly supported 
the “gateway drug thesis,” according to which the use of cannabis serves as a risk 
factor in increasing the user’s probability of using harder illicit substances, such as 
39.  FRIMAN, supra note 2. 
40.  U.S DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFF.,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 2–5 (2018). 
41.  DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (1st ed. 2001). 
42.  EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY ch. 2 (Steven Lukes ed., W.D. 
Hall trans., Simon & Schuster, 2d ed. 1997) (1893); Robert Reiner, Crime, Law and Deviance: The 
Durkheimian Legacy, in DURKHEIM AND MODERN SOCIOLOGY 175 (Steve Penton ed., 1984). 
43.  Nils Christie, Suitable Enemies, in ABOLITIONISM: TOWARD A NON-REPRESSIVE
APPROACH TO CRIME 34 (Herman Bianchi & Rene von Swaaningen eds., 1986). 
44.  LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL
INSECURITY (2009). 
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amphetamine, cocaine, or heroin. Based on this thesis (whose scientific validity was 
and remains controversial),45 the Board’s 1983 Report criticized those “circles in 
certain countries” that “apparently assume that to permit unrestricted use of some 
drug, regarded by them as less harmful, would permit better control of other drugs 
which they deem more perilous to health.”46 This criticism was leveled at supporters 
of the separation of markets strategy, which came to be endorsed by Dutch 
policymakers at the time.47 In its later reports throughout the 1980s and 90s, the 
Board adopted an increasingly critical stance toward the Dutch attempts to 
depenalize cannabis usage. In its 1997 Report, the selling of cannabis in coffee shops 
was depicted as “an activity that might be described as indirect incitement.”48 The 
focus on the Netherlands and its singling out for disapprobation reflects the rarity 
of open contestations of the prohibitionist imperatives enforced by the Board 
during that period. 
III. THE LEGITIMATION CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The extensive institutionalization of the cannabis prohibition TLO 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s facilitated the international spread of tougher laws, 
severer penalties, and more aggressive policing strategies. However, the very success 
of this TLO to propagate its policy models highlighted its failure to deliver on its 
own promise to reduce the prevalence of cannabis use and to eliminate its illicit 
supply chains. The intensification of enforcement activities also brought into focus 
the adverse human rights impacts of implementing the prohibitionist cannabis 
policies. The increasing criticisms of the failures and boomerang effects of the 
cannabis prohibition TLO prompted both internal and external processes that 
eroded its legitimacy and compromised its ability to continue guiding the practices 
of legal actors at the national and local levels. 
From the early stages of the institutionalization of the cannabis prohibition 
TLO, it became vulnerable to criticism of its inherent input legitimacy deficiencies. As 
discussed earlier, the central role played by the US in shaping the goals and strategies 
of this TLO has largely depended on the exercise of unilateral measures of coercion 
and inducement. The degree to which the certification process has realized basic 
standards of transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability is obviously limited. 
The procedures by which the INCB defines and applies its compliance criteria seem 
conspicuously insulated from ongoing public debates regarding the impact of 
cannabis prohibition laws on marginalized populations. These legitimacy deficits are 
conveniently set aside by proponents of the war on drugs, who tend to focus more 
45.  JULIA BUXTON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NARCOTICS: PRODUCTION,
CONSUMPTION, AND GLOBAL MARKETS 110–11 (2006). 
46.  INT’L NARCOTIC CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC
CONTROL BOARD FOR 1983, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/1983/1, U.N. Sales No. E.83.XI.6 (1984). 
47.  Henk Jan Van Vliet, Separation of Drug Markets and the Normalization of Drug Problems in the 
Netherlands: An Example for Other Nations?, 20 J. DRUG ISSUES 463 (1990). 
48.  Int’l Narcotic Control Bd., Report of the International Narcotic Control Board for 1997, 
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on the ability of these measures to promote global public goods than on the quality 
of the processes through which these measures are created. As Niko Krisch 
observes, such tendency to prioritize output legitimacy considerations is pronounced 
in various contexts of global governance and often produces pressure to move 
toward more informal and hierarchical modes of transnational governance in these 
issue-areas.49 However, this view is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in 
the issue-area of cannabis policy given the mounting evidence on the failure of this 
TLO to achieve its regulatory goals. Despite billions of dollars of investment and 
extensive law enforcement resources, a sizable body of scholarship has documented 
the growing availability of the drug during the 1990s, the widespread prevalence of 
its usage among adolescents, and the increasingly tolerant attitudes toward cannabis 
consumption among both users and non-users.50
Drawing analogies to the failure of the “Noble Experiment” of the alcohol 
prohibition period,51 criminologists developed thorough critiques of the underlying 
assumptions of the cannabis prohibition TLO. The assumption that the availability 
of cannabis can be meaningfully reduced by the deployment of militarized policing 
strategies (such as the aerial spraying of crops) has been criticized for overlooking 
the resilience of cannabis markets and their high levels of adaptability to changes in 
their regulatory environments. Studies have shown that rather than eliminating 
supply chains, such interventions served to disperse, displace, and fragment supply 
sources and distribution routes.52 In turn, such interventions precipitated a spillover 
of armed violence to new geographical areas and exposed otherwise uninvolved 
indigenous populations to new risks and insecurities. The inherent flaws of this 
dimension of the cannabis prohibition TLO are often illustrated by referencing the 
“balloon effect” metaphor, depicting the ways in which efforts to suppress the 
cultivation of cannabis in one geographical area causes a convenient shift of its 
production elsewhere. 
The legitimacy of the cannabis prohibition TLO has also been damaged by 
evidence regarding the immense human rights violations that the implementation 
of war on drugs policies has entailed. Advocacy networks led by prominent 
transnational NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 
have exposed the disproportionate punishments imposed under the banner of the 
war on drugs in various countries. In the US, such criticism focused on the 
contribution of marijuana prohibitions to the nation’s internationally unparalleled 
49.  Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108 AM.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2014). 
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incarceration rates and its distinctive patterns of racially-skewed law enforcement.53
A recent ACLU report using data extracted from the FBI’s Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program indicates that between 2001 and 2010, there were over eight 
million marijuana arrests in the US, of which 88% were for marijuana possession.54
In 2010, there were more than 20,000 people incarcerated for the sole charge of 
cannabis possession. Outside of the US, human rights activists focused on the 
increasing use of capital punishments for drug offenses from the late 1980s onward, 
as part of the broader escalation of enforcement efforts during the war on drugs 
era.55 The exportation and importation of illegal drugs constitute capital offenses in 
more than 30 countries. In China, Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines, the death 
penalty is exercised regularly for cannabis trafficking offenses. 
By the mid-1990s, the criticism leveled at the cannabis prohibition TLO began 
to stimulate increasing advocacy activity in favor of reform. These activities failed 
to change the direction of drug policymaking at the international level. Indeed, the 
“outcome document” issued in the wake of the 2016 UN General Assembly Special 
Session on drugs kept in place the existing framework of cannabis prohibition and 
did not endorse the calls to reclassify cannabis as a less dangerous drug. However, 
the criticism of the prohibitionist approach had a considerable transformative 
impact on the development of drug policies at the national and subnational levels. 
Before long, the diffusion of liberal cannabis policies across national borders began 
to jeopardize the normative settlements institutionalized by the cannabis 
prohibition TLO in previous decades. 
The efforts to liberalize cannabis regulations have focused on three distinct 
models of reform: depenalization, decriminalization, and legalization. Under formal 
depenalization regimes, the possession of cannabis is still formally prohibited; 
however, such prohibitions are enforced through intermediate justice measures 
rather than through conventional penal sanctions such as incarceration. The 
Netherlands pioneered the experimentation with depenalization strategies in 1976 
when it formalized the use of the expediency principle to guide the enforcement of drug 
prohibitions. Based on this principle, Dutch prosecutors are instructed not to bring 
charges when cannabis use offenses take place within the user’s home or within the 
so-called coffee shops, where cannabis can be openly consumed and purchased.56 From 
the 1990s onward, many national and subnational jurisdictions introduced cautioning
and diversion schemes to deal with drug use offenses.57 Cautioning schemes authorize 
police officers to avoid arresting suspected drug offenders under certain 
circumstances. Instead, the cautioning schemes require them to issue a written 
53.  MICHELE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2012); DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL
UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (2007).
54. ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 4 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/ 
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55.  RICHARD LINES, DRUG CONTROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87
(2017).
56.  VAN SOLINGE, supra note 26, at 516. 
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warning of the possible consequences of the illegal behavior. Diversion schemes, 
which may operate at the pre-trial, pre-sentence, or post-conviction stages of the 
legal process, are intended to shift offenders from the criminal justice system and 
its carceral institutions to other channels of legal intervention. When applied before 
the sentencing stage, such measures may require the offender to participate in 
certain treatment and education programs as part of the bail conditions. After the 
sentencing stage, diversion measures may subject a convicted offender to 
community-based or rehabilitative measures (e.g., community service and 
therapeutic programs). 
The widespread transnational diffusion of depenalization regimes is enabled 
by the structural mismatch between the actors shaping the formal rules of the 
international drug control system and those implementing these rules in national 
and local contexts.58 The diffusion of these regimes was not initiated by 
international organizations or powerful countries. Rather, it has evolved through 
uncoordinated processes of institutional isomorphism, reflecting converging 
professional concerns regarding the complexities of implementing criminal 
prohibitions that are extensively violated by ordinary citizens and that do not reflect 
widespread social disapprobation of the targeted activity. From the perspectives of 
ground-level enforcement officials and more senior bureaucratic elites, the 
implementation of cannabis prohibitions raised pragmatic concerns regarding the 
limited effectiveness of conventional penal measures and the immense costs that 
such efforts entailed. 
In democratic systems committed to the principle of legalism, it seems natural 
to expect that schemes of depenalization would translate into de jure changes in the 
statutory definitions governing processes of criminalization. The international drug 
conventions place constraints on the ability of national legislatures to introduce such 
reforms. However, the treaties also contain textual ambiguities that provide leeway 
for negotiating the scope and ambit of such prohibitions. The rise of the medical 
cannabis movement illustrates the unfolding of such processes of normative 
contestation. The movement began to gain ground in the early 1990s, focusing its 
efforts on promoting ballot initiatives at the municipal and state levels in the US.59
Within the next two decades, it effectively initiated the enactment of laws 
decriminalizing the medical use of marijuana in thirty-one states across the US and 
inspired norm entrepreneurs in dozens of other countries to campaign for the 
adoption of similar models. Countries adopting medical cannabis laws utilize the 
latitude allowed by the UN drug conventions regarding the definition of the term 
“medical and scientific purposes.” Importantly, they challenge the powerful view 
(which has long been defended by the US federal government and the INCB) that 
marijuana has no demonstrated medical use. In this regard, the medical cannabis 
movement has demonstrated the effectiveness of bottom-up legal mobilization 
58.  Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity of Global Lawmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANN. REV. L. &
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strategies operating at the subnational level to contest authoritative interpretations 
of transnational prohibition norms produced by powerful global actors. 
Building on the successes of the medical marijuana reform movement, 
advocacy networks in various countries have campaigned for the enactment of more 
radical models of decriminalizing and even legalizing the recreational use of 
cannabis. The seeds of this development were sown in the 1990s when European 
countries increased the thresholds of the amounts of cannabis possession exempted 
from criminal responsibility. Portugal, for example, adopted threshold parameters 
based on “the quantity required for an average individual consumption during a 
period of ten days.”60 Whereas Portugal adopted this policy as part of a 
comprehensive redesign of its drug laws on the basis of harm reduction principles,61
in other countries, these steps toward legalizing cannabis use were stimulated by 
court rulings reviewing the constitutionality of cannabis prohibitions. For example, 
in Argentina, a 2009 ruling by the Supreme Court struck down Article 14 of the 
country’s drug control legislation, which punished the possession of small amounts 
of cannabis with prison sentences ranging from one month to two years.62 The 
Court stated that the possession of cannabis is protected by Article 19 of Argentina’s 
Constitution, which states that “private actions that in no way offend public order 
or morality, nor are detrimental to a third party, are reserved for God and are 
beyond the authority of legislators.” Recent developments in Canada and nine US 
states signify the growing momentum of the trend toward the legalization of 
recreational uses of cannabis and the development of more complex regulatory 
models to govern legal cannabis markets.63 In different ways, these jurisdictions 
grant licenses to professional farmers and pharmacies to produce and to sell 
cannabis commercially and exempt individuals from criminal responsibility for non-
commercial uses. 
The trend toward liberalizing cannabis prohibitions illustrates the recursive 
nature of transnational processes of legal change. The networks of actors 
participating in these processes—comprised of grassroots activists, legislatures, 
bureaucratic elites, criminal justice actors, scientists, journalists, and public health 
officials—created new regulatory models that gradually transformed the application 
of cannabis prohibition norms in various jurisdictions. These actors invoked the 
indeterminacy of treaty provisions, contested the framing of cannabis use as 
indicative of a moral malaise, and highlighted the diverse ways in which the 
enforcement of cannabis prohibitions produces social harms that are severer than 
those generated by cannabis use. They also utilized the space for norm-making 
provided by the mismatch between the institutions and actors that formulate global 
60.  BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 157. 
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norms and those assigned with the actual implementation of these norms in national 
and sub-national settings. The success of these campaigns warrants a reflection on 
the conditions under which (and the extent to which) local and national acts of 
contesting TLOs can reshape the agenda of global actors invested in preserving the 
current normative settlements. The following section focuses on this question. 
IV. AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS?
The rapid and widespread transnational diffusion of new models of 
decriminalizing, depenalizing or legalizing the use of marijuana serves as a product 
and a catalyst of the declining capacity of the cannabis prohibition TLO to shape 
the policy choices of criminal lawmakers and the routine practices of enforcement 
officials. However, to what extent do these reforms change the agendas of the global 
actors that play key roles in shaping and maintaining the normative and institutional 
structures of this TLO? 
Faced with the global spread of cannabis liberalization reforms, the INCB has 
positioned itself as the most steadfast defender of the normative expectancies of 
the cannabis prohibition TLO.64 In its annual reports, the Board contested the 
legitimacy of the legal interpretations underpinning states’ engagement with 
decriminalization, depenalization, and legalization initiatives. The Board repeatedly 
expressed its concern that the introduction of civil sanctions for possession offenses 
was sending the wrong signal, downplaying the health risks of marijuana use. It 
criticized medical cannabis reforms and questioned the scientific basis on which 
they are premised. Most recently, the Board condemned Uruguay and Canada for 
adopting legalization schemes, stating that such reforms constituted clear breaches 
of the international conventions. 
The literature examining the roles of naming and shaming mechanisms in 
international politics observes that most countries are inclined to bring their laws 
into formal compliance with international standards to avoid being stigmatized as 
“deviant states.”65 The efforts of the INCB to achieve such influence by 
condemning countries deviating from the prohibitionist expectancies of the 
international drug conventions failed to generate such adaptive responses.66 Some 
countries have practically ignored the Board’s proposed interpretation of the 
international obligations set by the conventions. Others have argued that the 
Board’s interpretive approach was too narrow and relied on selective use of the 
available evidence-base concerning the medical uses of cannabis. Still others 
contended that the Board was exceeding its mandate when it adopted a hostile 
stance toward legitimate policy choices of sovereign states.67 The limited impact of 
the Board’s attempts to delegitimize the adoption of non-punitive models of 
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cannabis regulation provides important insights into the conditions under which 
naming and shaming strategies can succeed.68 One reason for this limited impact is 
that some of the central countries pioneering the experimentation with 
decriminalization and legalization schemes are not particularly vulnerable to 
economic and reputational pressures.69 Supporters of cannabis liberalization 
reforms across Europe and North America justify these policies on the grounds that 
they are needed to reconcile drug policies with fundamental human rights values as 
well as with human development concerns.70 In this polemical context, it is 
unsurprising that the INCB, which has long failed to restrain the human rights 
abuses inflicted in the name of the war on drugs, has not succeeded in harnessing 
transnational civil society actors to support its line of attack on the perceived 
departures from the settled interpretations of the international drug conventions. 
Whereas the INCB has remained unambiguously committed to the task of 
defending the normative settlements of the cannabis prohibition TLO, the 
approach taken by the US has been marked by ambivalence.71 President Barack 
Obama’s administration adopted the ambiguous position of respecting the decisions 
of US states legalizing the medical and recreational use of marijuana while 
continuing to condemn steps toward legalization in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. Responding to shifts in national public opinion, the administration set 
out lenient guidelines for the federal prosecution of marijuana users in states that 
had legalized its medical and recreational uses.72 It thereby allowed legalized drug 
markets to take roots in Colorado and Washington, and subsequently in other states. 
Like other national governments, the US federal government invoked its domestic 
constitutional principles (particularly the principles governing the distribution of 
legislative power within the US federal system) to argue that its policies are in 
compliance with the international standards. However, during the same period, the 
US continued to apply its strict punitive approach to evaluating the compliance of 
other countries with the UN drug conventions. The annual certification process 
continues to include assessments of the extent to which the seventeen countries 
currently identified as “drug majors” are willing to eradicate the cultivation of 
cannabis and to penalize its growers and sellers. With a majority of Americans 
supporting the legalization of marijuana (64% according to a 2017 Gallup Poll)73
and a majority of US states already implementing decriminalization schemes for 
medical marijuana, lawmakers in the House and Senate are facing increasing 
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pressure to end the federal ban on cannabis. Despite efforts by Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions to revive the zero-tolerance approach of the federal government, 
President Donald J. Trump has recently expressed his intention to support such 
reforms. It is too early to predict whether and when such a change will take place 
or how it will impact the federal government’s foreign policy stance on the issue of 
cannabis legalization. However, as long as the US adheres to this “do as I say, not 
as I do” message, its ambivalent posture enables further steps toward the unsettling 
of cannabis prohibition norms. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that despite its declining regulatory 
effectiveness, the cannabis prohibition TLO continues to exert considerable 
influence on the development of drug policies at the international, regional, 
national, and local levels. In this context, it is notable that countries that have 
liberalized their cannabis laws emphasize their commitment to remain bound by the 
confines of the current treaty regimes of the international drug control system. 
Remarkably, the extensive recognition of the severe failures and counterproductive 
effects of the cannabis prohibition TLO has not generated viable political efforts to 
amend the international treaties underpinning its operation. To a considerable 
extent, the reluctance to renegotiate the treaty norms governing cannabis policies 
stems from the notion that the cannabis prohibition TLO is embedded within the 
mega-TLO of the international narcotic control system.74 This serves as a powerful 
mechanism of issue linkage, leading countries that support cannabis liberalization 
reforms to avoid initiating formal treaty amendments out of concern that such 
actions might destabilize the settled norms prevailing in other issue-areas of narcotic 
control (e.g. the norms governing the regulation of illicit markets of heroin, cocaine 
and synthetic opiates). The fact that the UN drug conventions regulate the global 
trade of both the illicit and licit uses of drugs, including substances on the World 
Health Organization’s list of essential medicines, further escalates the stakes in 
renegotiating the terms of these treaties. In addition, the reputational costs of 
defecting from UN crime suppression treaties might be higher than those suffered 
by persistent objectors in other areas of public international law. The branding of 
countries as pariah states, or “narco-states,” as it were, carries a stigma that resonates 
with the censuring functions performed by criminal labels in domestic contexts.75
These factors help explain why current efforts to restructure the regulatory 
frameworks governing cannabis markets are contained within the narrow space of 
policy experimentalism created by the textual ambiguity of the current treaties. 
Under these circumstances, many of the inherent weaknesses of the prohibitionist 
approach resurface (though in a more attenuated form) in the new regulatory 
landscapes created by the decriminalization and depenalization of possession 
offenses. The involvement of criminal organizations in illicit drug markets remains 
significant given the illegality of supply-related activities. The growing formalization 
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of intermediate sanctions has a net-widening effect, which expands the use of 
control measures against low-risk drug offenders.76 Most fundamentally, the 
insistence on promoting drug liberalization reforms within the confines of the 
current system constrains the capacity of individual states and of the international 
community to imagine more effective and humane alternatives, such as those 
offered by harm-reduction and development-centered approaches. 
CONCLUSION
Transnational legal orders both enable and constrain the development of new 
regulatory models. The enabling function of TLOs rests not only on the 
institutionalization of measures of negotiating, codifying and implementing legal 
norms with a global reach, but also on their tendency to generate dynamics of 
resistance and contestation which are conducive to the production of new norms 
and institutional forms.77 This chapter analyzed the ways in which such acts of 
norm-making unfolded in the issue-area of cannabis prohibition, driven by recursive 
mechanisms such as legal indeterminacy, diagnostic struggles, actor mismatch, and 
ideological contradictions. The discussion has also demonstrated that even when 
they undergo processes of fragmentation and polarization, TLOs can constrain the 
capacity of these acts of contestation to generate new normative settlements. 
Mindful of Niels Bohr’s advice that “prediction is very hard, particularly about the 
future,” we conclude this chapter by hoping that a better understanding of how 
transnational legal orders facilitate and hinder recursive legal change can illuminate 
some of the possible trajectories for the future development of cannabis regulations. 
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